Letter to August Bebel, October 13, 1891

Author(s) Friedrich Engels
Written 13 October 1891


First published in: Marx and Engels, Works, First Russian Edition, Vol. XXVIII, Moscow, 1940
Printed according to the original
Published in English for the first time in Marx-Engels Collected Works, Volume 49


ENGELS TO AUGUST BEBEL

IN BERLIN

London, 13 October 1891

Dear August,

All I have time for today is to send you a reply about the Russians and in fact this is the only item of importance; the other business is over and done with.[1]

As to the likelihood of war breaking out early next year, there are in Russia three important currents. First you have the diplomats. Of the latter I have said all along that they look for victories without the expense or risk of war, but for that very reason see to it that everything is placed on a warlike footing in order that Russia's enormously fa- vourable defensive position may be exploited to the full. This hap- pens every time. They can then put forward outrageous demands and stick to them up to the last minute and then, without a shot being fired, extract the maximum profit from the enemy — who has more to lose — by playing upon his fear of war. Alongside the diplomats, how- ever, you have the soldiers who, despite their numerous mishaps on the field of battle, are exceedingly cock-a-hoop and full of bluster— more so than anywhere else. They want to let fly. And, thirdly, you have the new bourgeoisie to whom, as to the American bourgeoisie of the 40s, the expansion of the market appears as MANIFEST DESTINY, as Russia's historic mission, namely the liberation of the Slavs and Greeks and the domination of the eastern continent. All three must be taken into account; under Alexander III the diplomats have hith- erto been consistently victorious. Now there is famine to be reckoned with and in the east and south-east this is very severe. East of the line Odessa-Nizhni Novgorod and Vyatka there is acute famine every- where; to the west of this line the harvest showed a gradual improve- ment and in the west itself the wheat harvest was passable in places though the rye harvest was consistently poor. In Russia potatoes are not a staple food. The extremely acute form assumed by the famine in the Volga basin shows how wretched Russia's communications still are. For that reason it seems plain to me that you would expose your- self unnecessarily should you seek to place credence in the assurances of those presenting the German military estimates when they tell you that war may certainly be expected next spring. It is just as much the job of Russia's diplomats to prepare for war with an assiduity that is all the greater for their reluctance to embark on it, as it is the duty of the General Staff to talk you people in the Reichstag into believing that war will definitely break out in April '92. You are perfectly right to pay careful attention to these statements and I shall be very grate- ful for any authentic information in this connection; however the chaps also have their ulterior motives.

This point is not as academic as it seems. For it will assume the ut- most importance the moment the government estimates are present- ed to the Reichstag. If we are positive that there'll be a bust up early next year, we can hardly be opposed to these estimates in principle. And that would be a pretty disastrous state of affairs so far as we are concerned. For the arse-crawling parties would all be overjoyed that they should have been proved right and that we should now have to spurn our policy of the past twenty years. And so impromptu a change of course would also cause enormous friction within the party. And internationally as well.

On the other hand there may nevertheless be a war in the spring. What then should our attitude to the estimates be?

In my view there can only be one attitude: 1. There's no longer time in which to change our weapons. If peace prevails until new can- non and a rifle of even smaller calibre are introduced, peace will in any case presumably continue to prevail. So these objections don't hold water. 2. The same applies, if to an even greater extent, to new cadres for the standing army — I mean to the demand for new reg- iments. In view of the gigantic armies of today, the few new for- mations which may now be demanded are of no account and, if they are to serve as training cadres enabling more men to be recruited and trained, they can only do so during an extended period of peace and thus would be useless so far as a war next spring is concerned.— On the other hand we can, however, 3. vote estimates where the inten- tion is to bring today's army closer to the concept of a whole people under arms, to strengthen the defensive side alone, to train and arm bodies of men of any age between 17 and 60 who have not yet been conscripted and to incorporate them into permanent cadres without a proliferation of pettifogging regulations. While the threat of war persists we cannot demand that the existing organisation of the army be revolutionised, but if we seek to prepare the vast mass of untrained but able-bodied men as best as we can and organise them in cadres — for actual battle, not for show or pettifoggery—that will bring us closer to our concept of a people's militia which alone is acceptable to us.

Should the threat of war increase, we can then tell the government that we should be prepared, if enabled to do so by decent treatment, to support them against a foreign enemy, provided they prosecuted the war ruthlessly and with all available means, including revolution- ary ones. Should Germany be attacked from the east and west, all means of defence would be justified. It is a question not only of the nation's existence but also, in our own case, of asserting the position and the future prospects for which we have fought. The more revolu- tionary the prosecution of the war, the more it will be waged in accor- dance with our ideas. And it might happen that, in contrast to the cow- ardice of the bourgeoisie and Junkers, who want to save their prop- erty, we should turn out to be the only truly vigorous war party. Of course it might also happen that we should have to take the helm and do a 1794 in order to chuck out the Russians and their allies.

I must close so as to get this letter registered (cannot be done after 5 o'clock). From past experience I felt pretty sure that the first field army would be surreptitiously receiving substantial rein- forcements but we are glad to have authentic confirmation of this point. So far as the Austrians are concerned, the men are absolutely first-rate, the junior officers possess pluck but vary greatly in the mat- ter of battle-training, while the senior ranks are utterly unpredict- able. A man can rise to the top there on the strength of his services as pimp to Francis Joseph.

I shall get something done for the French on the question of the war,[2] but it will be damned difficult not to do more harm than good; the chaps are so touchy.

Constans is doing all he can to promote Lafargue's candidature by resorting to some typical Prussian chicanery; that is no good in France.

But how will things work out with the present war policy and with Liebknecht at the Foreign Office? His foreign policy — Parnell, Gari- baldi festival in Nice, etc.— is beneath contempt.[3] What with his adoration of the 'Republic', there's the prospect of a nice old rumpus before long.

If you are so certain that war will break out in the spring, it seems to me that you ought at least to discuss the matter behind the scenes when you hold your party congress.[4]

Regards from Louise and

Your

F. E.

  1. ↑ In his letter of 9 October 1891, which Engels is answering, Bebel noted the increas ing threat of war and suggested that, in all probability, the hostilities would be un leashed by Russia, with France to join in next.
  2. ↑ On 23 September 1891 Laura Lafargue, on behalf of the French Workers' Party, requested Engels to write an article for the Almanack du Parti Ouvrier pour 1892. As a theme, she said, Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue had suggested 'Socialism in Germany'. Engels replied positively. The article he wrote, 'Le Socialisme en Alle magne', appeared in Almanack in early December 1891. Somewhat later Engels translated it into German for Neue ^eit, adding a brief introduction and a conclud ing section. The article was published in Die Neue .£«7, 10. Jg. 1891/92, 1. Bd., Nr. 19 under the heading 'Der Sozialismus in Deutschland' (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 235-50).
  3. ↑ In his letter of 12 September 1891 Bebel informed Engels of forthcoming changes on the editorial board of Vorwärts. He wrote: 'Hirsch will become, with our sup port, Editor-in-Chief proper, while Liebknecht will retire to his reserved property and get the Foreign Ministry...'
  4. ↑ The Erfurt Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany met from 14 to 21 October 1891. It was attended by 258 delegates.
    The congress was preceded by a sharp ideological struggle between the party's revolutionary hard core and the Right- and Left-wing opportunists, who had stepped up their activities and created the atmosphere of a party crisis in German Social-Democracy.
    There had been sharp debates at meetings and in the press on the party's pro gramme and tactics, set off by the public pronouncements of Georg von Vollmar, leader of the Bavarian Social-Democrats, who sought to impose an opportunist re formist tactics and lead the party away from class proletarian positions (see Note 270).
    Vollmar's campaign provided a pretext for fresh attacks on the party (summer and autumn 1891) by the Jungen, a petty-bourgeois semi-anarchist opposition group within German Social-Democracy formed in 1890. Their stronghold being the Social-Democratic organisation of Berlin, they were also known as the Berlin opposition. The group's specific character was determined by students and young literati claiming the role of the party's theoreticians and leaders. Foremost among them were Paul Ernst, Hans Müller, Paul Kampflfmeyer, Bruno Wille, Karl Wil- derberger and Wilhelm Werner. The Jungen ignored the fact that the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Law had changed the conditions the party was operating in. They denied the need to employ legal forms of struggle, opposed Social-Democracy's participation in parliamentary elections and use of the parliamentary platform and demagogically accused the party and its Executive of protecting the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, of opportunism and of violating party democracy. The leaders of the Berlin opposition levelled especially fierce attacks at the party's leaders— Bebel and Liebknecht. The sectarian anarchist activities of the Jungen held a grave danger to the party's unity. The paramount task facing the Erfurt Con gress was to overcome the crisis in the party and consolidate its ranks.
    The congress discussed the report of the party Executive, the activities of So cial-Democratic deputies in the Reichstag, the party's tactics, the draft of its new programme, and various organisational questions.
    The ideological struggle continued at the congress too, especially over party tactics. A report on this issue was presented by Bebel. He — in his report and speeches — as well as other speakers (above all Singer, Liebknecht and Fischer) gave a resolute rebuff both to the Left and to the Right opportunist elements. By a majority vote the congress endorsed Bebel's draft resolution on tactics. It pointed out that the main objective of the working-class movement was the conquest of po litical power by the proletariat and that this end would be attained not through a chance concatenation of circumstances but through persevering work with the masses and skillful employment of every form and method of proletarian class struggle. The resolution emphasised that the German Social-Democratic Party was a fighting party employing the traditional revolutionary tactics. Vollmar and his supporters, finding themselves in isolation, were forced to retreat. The congress expelled two leaders of the Jungen — Werner and Wilderberger — from the party for their splitting activities and slander; a number of other Jungen leaders an nounced their resignation from the party and walked out of the congress.
    The main achievement of the congress was the adoption of a new programme for German Social-Democracy. A report on it was presented by Liebknecht.
    The Erfurt Programme being essentially Marxist, was an important step for ward compared with the Gotha Programme. The Lassallean reformist dogmas had been dropped. The new programme scientifically substantiated the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and its replacement with socialism, and pointed out that, in order to be able to restructure society along socialist lines, the proletariat must win political power.
    At the same time, the programme had serious shortcomings, the principal one being its failure to state that the dictatorship of the proletariat was the instrument of the socialist transformation of society. Also missing were propositions concerning the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic, the remoulding of Germany's political system and other important matters. In this respect, the criticisms made by Engels in A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891 (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 217-34) also apply to the ver sion of the programme adopted in Erfurt.
    The resolutions of the Erfurt congress showed that Marxism had firmly taken root in Germany's working-class movement.