Letter to Paul Lafargue, October 13, 1891

Author(s)	Friedrich Engels
Written	13 October 1891

First published in F. Engels, P. et L. Lafargue, Correspondance, t. III, Paris, 1959
Printed according to the original
Translated from the French
Published in English for the first time in Marx-Engels Collected Works, Volume 49

ENGELS TO PAUL LAFARGUE

AT LE PERREUX

London, 13 October 1891

My dear Lafargue,

Why didn't you ask me for the cheque as soon as you needed it? Why expose Laura to such humiliations when you know that one word from you — or from her — would be enough to put a stop to them?

That dear man Constans would seem to be intent on making you deputy for Lille whatever the cost — so much the better, let's hope he pulls it off. If all you have for opponent is an Opportunist, you should have every chance of success. It is of the utmost importance that we should have you in the Chamber—the other socialist deputies don't seem to be UP TO SNUFF, they're feeble, feeble, feeble!

Constans will undoubtedly do his best to upset your plans — but in that case he will be working for you, just as Bismarck in Germany worked for us. For in my country it's not the socialists who work for the King of Prussia^[1] ; rather it's the King of Prussia^b who works for the socialists. And it may well be that the fury aroused in Constans' breast by the boos and catcalls at Marseilles will prove a powerful level in getting you elected. 'Above all, don't be too zealous,'^[2] Mr Constans!!

I have a long letter to write to Bebel^[3] today on the subject of the Erfurt Congress^[4] ; there are several very important questions to dis- cuss. That's why I must cut this letter short. Keep smiling, try always to poke fun at your opponents, PUT YOUR TRUST IN THE HISTORICAL LUCK OF THE PARTY, AND KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY.

F.E.

Likewise from Pumps and the children who are still here. The little girl^[5] needs a steel brace for her back (she is growing too fast) and the man who is making it keeps dragging his feet from one day to the next.

↑ i.e. for nothing ^b William II
↑ This is a paraphrase of Talleyrand's saying, 'Surtout, Messieurs. Point de zèle' (Above all, sirs, not too much zeal).
↑ See next letter.
↑ The Erfurt Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany met from 14 to 21 October 1891. It was attended by 258 delegates.
The congress was preceded by a sharp ideological struggle between the party's revolutionary hard core and the Right- and Left-wing opportunists, who had stepped up their activities and created the atmosphere of a party crisis in German Social-Democracy.
There had been sharp debates at meetings and in the press on the party's pro gramme and tactics, set off by the public pronouncements of Georg von Vollmar, leader of the Bavarian Social-Democrats, who sought to impose an opportunist re formist tactics and lead the party away from class proletarian positions (see Note 270).
Vollmar's campaign provided a pretext for fresh attacks on the party (summer and autumn 1891) by the Jungen, a petty-bourgeois semi-anarchist opposition group within German Social-Democracy formed in 1890. Their stronghold being the Social-Democratic organisation of Berlin, they were also known as the Berlin opposition. The group's specific character was determined by students and young literati claiming the role of the party's theoreticians and leaders. Foremost among them were Paul Ernst, Hans Müller, Paul Kampflfmeyer, Bruno Wille, Karl Wil- derberger and Wilhelm Werner. The Jungen ignored the fact that the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Law had changed the conditions the party was operating in. They denied the need to employ legal forms of struggle, opposed Social-Democracy's participation in parliamentary elections and use of the parliamentary platform and demagogically accused the party and its Executive of protecting the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, of opportunism and of violating party democracy. The leaders of the Berlin opposition levelled especially fierce attacks at the party's leaders— Bebel and Liebknecht. The sectarian anarchist activities of the Jungen held a grave danger to the party's unity. The paramount task facing the Erfurt Con gress was to overcome the crisis in the party and consolidate its ranks.
The congress discussed the report of the party Executive, the activities of So cial-Democratic deputies in the Reichstag, the party's tactics, the draft of its new programme, and various organisational questions.
The ideological struggle continued at the congress too, especially over party tactics. A report on this issue was presented by Bebel. He — in his report and speeches — as well as other speakers (above all Singer, Liebknecht and Fischer) gave a resolute rebuff both to the Left and to the Right opportunist elements. By a majority vote the congress endorsed Bebel's draft resolution on tactics. It pointed out that the main objective of the working-class movement was the conquest of po litical power by the proletariat and that this end would be attained not through a chance concatenation of circumstances but through persevering work with the masses and skillful employment of every form and method of proletarian class struggle. The resolution emphasised that the German Social-Democratic Party was a fighting party employing the traditional revolutionary tactics. Vollmar and his supporters, finding themselves in isolation, were forced to retreat. The congress expelled two leaders of the Jungen — Werner and Wilderberger — from the party for their splitting activities and slander; a number of other Jungen leaders an nounced their resignation from the party and walked out of the congress.
The main achievement of the congress was the adoption of a new programme for German Social-Democracy. A report on it was presented by Liebknecht.
The Erfurt Programme being essentially Marxist, was an important step for ward compared with the Gotha Programme. The Lassallean reformist dogmas had been dropped. The new programme scientifically substantiated the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and its replacement with socialism, and pointed out that, in order to be able to restructure society along socialist lines, the proletariat must win political power.
At the same time, the programme had serious shortcomings, the principal one being its failure to state that the dictatorship of the proletariat was the instrument of the socialist transformation of society. Also missing were propositions concerning the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic, the remoulding of Germany's political system and other important matters. In this respect, the criticisms made by Engels in A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891 (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 217-34) also apply to the ver sion of the programme adopted in Erfurt.
The resolutions of the Erfurt congress showed that Marxism had firmly taken root in Germany's working-class movement.
↑ Lilian Rosher

[1] .e. for nothing ^b William II

[2] This is a paraphrase of Talleyrand's saying, 'Surtout, Messieurs. Point de zèle' (Above all, sirs, not too much zeal).

[3] See next letter.

[4] The Erfurt Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany met from 14 to 21 October 1891. It was attended by 258 delegates.
The congress was preceded by a sharp ideological struggle between the party's revolutionary hard core and the Right- and Left-wing opportunists, who had stepped up their activities and created the atmosphere of a party crisis in German Social-Democracy.
There had been sharp debates at meetings and in the press on the party's pro gramme and tactics, set off by the public pronouncements of Georg von Vollmar, leader of the Bavarian Social-Democrats, who sought to impose an opportunist re formist tactics and lead the party away from class proletarian positions (see Note 270).
Vollmar's campaign provided a pretext for fresh attacks on the party (summer and autumn 1891) by the Jungen, a petty-bourgeois semi-anarchist opposition group within German Social-Democracy formed in 1890. Their stronghold being the Social-Democratic organisation of Berlin, they were also known as the Berlin opposition. The group's specific character was determined by students and young literati claiming the role of the party's theoreticians and leaders. Foremost among them were Paul Ernst, Hans Müller, Paul Kampflfmeyer, Bruno Wille, Karl Wil- derberger and Wilhelm Werner. The Jungen ignored the fact that the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Law had changed the conditions the party was operating in. They denied the need to employ legal forms of struggle, opposed Social-Democracy's participation in parliamentary elections and use of the parliamentary platform and demagogically accused the party and its Executive of protecting the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, of opportunism and of violating party democracy. The leaders of the Berlin opposition levelled especially fierce attacks at the party's leaders— Bebel and Liebknecht. The sectarian anarchist activities of the Jungen held a grave danger to the party's unity. The paramount task facing the Erfurt Con gress was to overcome the crisis in the party and consolidate its ranks.
The congress discussed the report of the party Executive, the activities of So cial-Democratic deputies in the Reichstag, the party's tactics, the draft of its new programme, and various organisational questions.
The ideological struggle continued at the congress too, especially over party tactics. A report on this issue was presented by Bebel. He — in his report and speeches — as well as other speakers (above all Singer, Liebknecht and Fischer) gave a resolute rebuff both to the Left and to the Right opportunist elements. By a majority vote the congress endorsed Bebel's draft resolution on tactics. It pointed out that the main objective of the working-class movement was the conquest of po litical power by the proletariat and that this end would be attained not through a chance concatenation of circumstances but through persevering work with the masses and skillful employment of every form and method of proletarian class struggle. The resolution emphasised that the German Social-Democratic Party was a fighting party employing the traditional revolutionary tactics. Vollmar and his supporters, finding themselves in isolation, were forced to retreat. The congress expelled two leaders of the Jungen — Werner and Wilderberger — from the party for their splitting activities and slander; a number of other Jungen leaders an nounced their resignation from the party and walked out of the congress.
The main achievement of the congress was the adoption of a new programme for German Social-Democracy. A report on it was presented by Liebknecht.
The Erfurt Programme being essentially Marxist, was an important step for ward compared with the Gotha Programme. The Lassallean reformist dogmas had been dropped. The new programme scientifically substantiated the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and its replacement with socialism, and pointed out that, in order to be able to restructure society along socialist lines, the proletariat must win political power.
At the same time, the programme had serious shortcomings, the principal one being its failure to state that the dictatorship of the proletariat was the instrument of the socialist transformation of society. Also missing were propositions concerning the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic, the remoulding of Germany's political system and other important matters. In this respect, the criticisms made by Engels in A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891 (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 217-34) also apply to the ver sion of the programme adopted in Erfurt.
The resolutions of the Erfurt congress showed that Marxism had firmly taken root in Germany's working-class movement.

[5] Lilian Rosher

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]