| Author(s) | Karl Marx |
|---|---|
| Written | 4 February 1878 |
MARX TO WILHELM LIEBKNECHT[1]
IN LEIPZIG
[London,] 4 February 1878
... We are most decidely espousing the Turkish cause and for 2 reasons:
1. because we have studied the Turkish peasant—i.e. the mass of the Turkish people—and in this way have come to see him as indubitably one of the ablest and most moral representatives of the peasantry in Europe;
2. because the defeat of the Russians would have greatly expedited social revolution in Russia, of which all the elements are present in abundant measure, and hence radical change throughout Europe.
Things took a different course. Why? In consequence of England's and Austria's treachery. England—I mean the English government—came, for example, to the rescue of the Serbs when they had been beaten[2] ; by misrepresenting the facts, she caused the Turks to suspend hostilities in the erroneous belief that the Russians had proffered an armistice (through England) of which the first condition was the aforesaid suspension. It was this alone that enabled the Russians to win their final spate of victories.'[3] Otherwise their armies would have been decimated by hunger and cold; only the opening up of the way to Rumelia where supplies were to be had (i.e. taken) and where, furthermore, the climate was milder, permitted them to escape from the mousetrap in Bulgaria, cram-full with soldiers, and pour their hordes into the south. Disraeli was (and still is) hamstrung in his own cabinet by the Marquis of Salisbury, Russian agent and confidant of Ignatiyev, by the Grand Cophta[4] OF COMMONPLACE—EARL OF Derby—and by the EARL OF Carnarvon, who has since resigned.
Austria prevented the Turks from enjoying the fruits of their victories in Montenegro, etc.[5]
Finally—and this is one of the main reasons for their ultimate defeat—the Turks failed to stir up revolution in Constantinople, thus allowing that incarnation of the old Seraglio régime — Mahmud Hamad—brother-in-law to the Sultan,[6] to remain the real power behind the war — exactly the same thing as actually entrusting the Russian cabinet with the conduct of the war against itself. The systematic paralysing and compromising of the Turkish army by this laddie can be demonstrated down to the smallest detail. Come to that, everyone in Constantinople is aware of it and this increases the historical guilt of the Turks. A people incapable of resolute revolutionary action at moments of intense crisis such as this is doomed. The Russian government knew what Damad was worth to them; it brought more strategy and tactics to bear on keeping Midhat Pasha away from Constantinople and Damad at the helm than on the capture of Plevna.'[7]
The man behind the Russian victory was, of course, Bismarck. He was responsible for the Alliance of the Three Emperors'[8]
whereby Austria was kept quiet. Even after the fall of Plevna all Austria would have had to do was marshal 100,000 men—and the Russians would have been compelled quietly to withdraw or to content themselves with the paltriest of spoils. From the start, Austria's abdication gave the Russian party in England the upper hand, France (as a result of the post-Sedan catastrophe— catastrophe after Sedan[9] —engineered by the then premier, Mr Gladstone) having ceased to exist in English eyes as a continental military power.
The consequence will simply be the dissolution of Austria, which is inevitable if the Russian peace terms be accepted and this means that Turkey (at least in Europe) will continue to exist in name only. Turkey was Austria's barrier against Russia and her retinue of Slavs. So presumably at the first appropriate moment there'll be a call for 'Bohemia'.
But Prussia qua Prussia—i.e. as specifically opposed to Germany—also has interests of a different kind: Prussia as such is her dynasty, she has come to be and is what she is on Russia's 'warranty'. The defeat of Russia, revolution in Russia, would ring Prussia's death-knell.
For otherwise, after the great victory over France, after Prussia had become the leading military power in Europe, we may presume that not even Mr von Bismarck would have assigned her the same position vis-à-vis Russia as she had occupied in 1815 as a supernumerary on the political stage of Europe.
Finally, to panjandrums such as Bismarck, Moltke, etc., the prospect of personal eminence held out by the succession of European wars now beginning... is by no means a matter of indifference.
It goes without saying that Prussia must, as occasion arises, demand 'compensation' for the Russian victories which she alone made possible. This is already plainly evident from the behaviour of the Russians vis-à-vis the Romanian government which had gone to the rescue of those same Russians at Plevna before Muscovite reinforcements arrived.
Karl von Hohenzollern is now to demonstrate his gratitude by handing back the part of Bessarabia ceded by the Russians after the Crimean War.[10] That this will not be permitted out of hand by Berlin, Petersburg is aware, and is prepared to make HANDSOME compensation.
But there are other aspects to all this. Turkey and Austria were the last bulwarks of the old European political order that was patched up again in 1815; with their downfall it will suffer total collapse. This debacle—which will take the form of a series of ('localised' and ultimately 'general') wars—will precipitate the social crisis—-and with it the decline of all these sabre-rattling SHAM POWERS.
Karl Marx