Letter to Friedrich Engels, January 18, 1854

Author(s) Karl Marx
Written 18 January 1854


First published in Der Briefwechsel zwischen F. Engels und K. Marx, Bd. 2, Stuttgart, 1913
Published in English for the first time in Marx-Engels Collected Works, Volume 39


MARX TO ENGELS

IN MANCHESTER

[London,] 18 January 1854 28 Dean Street, Soho

Dear Frederic,

You must let me have by Friday[1] something of a general nature (it is hardly possible to be specific) about the Battle of Citale or Zitale.[2] It seems to me that:

1. The battle of Oltenitza was a misunderstanding which frustrated the armistice imposed by the Ambassadors on the Porte. Similarly the Battle of Citatea[3] was a misunderstanding which frustrated the peace proposals dictated to the Porte under the guns of the English warships.

2. The obverse of Oltenitza. In the one case the Turks entrenched, in the other the Russians, etc.

3. Same result. After a murderous set-to lasting five days, the fellows drew in their respective horns. All I see is the result. I don't know what should have happened. All I do know is that this is not the way Napoleon fought a war.

So enmeshed in their own webs have the diplomatic intriguers become that a guerre générale is imminent. As you know, the EVENT AT Sinope—not to mention Mr Redcliffe's threats—was intended to induce the Turks to accept the Protocol of Vienna and bring Halil and Riza Pasha into the government.[4] Once all this had been engineered, Palmerston resigned.[5] On 19 December, while he was still out of office, the coalition smelt a rat and ordered a demonstration in the Black Sea. Palmerston, doubly discredited, returned to office and effected the decision of the 26th, that the entire fleet was to sail into the Black Sea, but to do no more than assume a neutral role vis-à-vis the two BELLIGERENTS; ostensibly going further than the decision of the 19th, but in fact attempting to thwart it and cut the Turks off from their Asiatic theatre of war. In the meantime, however, Mr Bonaparte, basing himself on the decision of the 19th, has already issued contrary orders and purports to interpret the decision of the 26th merely as an extension of the first. Palmerston, OF COURSE, had to make the best of a bad thing and preserve his reputation as an energetic patriot. In this way the fellows have got themselves into a pretty pickle and their dissimulation will land them in an even worse one, especially since Parliament will have to be shown on the 31st that 'energetic' steps are being taken. The Note which the fellows submitted to the Turks for signature shows that the former were prepared for a total SURRENDER TO RUSSIA and that only 'misunderstandings' frustrated this good intention.[6]

My brother-in-law—le ministre[7] —wrote and told my mother-in-law[8] that she was unfortunately about to relive her experience of 40 years ago, namely a general war.

I forwarded your letter to Steffen[9] the same day to Brussels where Steffen is still staying with his sister. I fear that, at this particular juncture, your 'Napoleon as Lieutenant of Artillery'[10] will be rejected, as The Times has had orders to refrain from any semblance of anti-Bonaparte polemics. Since he is 'our' ally, every paper will be moved by the same patriotic considerations just now. Anyway, as soon as the thing is ready, and if the papers won't have it, we shall bring it out as a pamphlet. Where my own work is concerned, I feel embarrassed about offering it to a publisher. The same gêne[11] would not apply to yours.

That jackass Weydemeyer has again shelved 'the noble consciousness'.[12] The main thing was speed in answering. 6 weeks too late, and the thing's SILLY. I cannot understand Cluss, and why he should always pick on me of all people to be Mr Weydemeyer's victim.

Your

K. M.

  1. ↑ 20 January.
  2. ↑ Marx took the wrong spelling from the English newspapers; should be Citatea as below.
  3. ↑ general war
  4. ↑ At the battle of Sinope between Russian and Turkish naval squadrons on 30 (18) November 1853, during the Crimean war, the Turks were defeated. After the battle of Sinope, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, British Ambassador to Constantinople, handed the Sultan a recommendation from the British Government to conclude a three months' armistice with Russia; at the same time he tried to get British squadrons sent immediately to the Black Sea. The Vienna Protocol was signed on 5 December 1853 at the conference of representatives of Britain, France, Prussia and Austria. In this Protocol, as in the subsequent Note of 12 December, the four powers offered to mediate in the conflict between Russia and Turkey. As a basis for negotiations they demanded the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russians, renewal of former treaties between Russia and Turkey, guarantee of Christians' rights by special firmans and a reform of the administrative system in Turkey. In a Note of 31 December 1853 the Turkish Government stated its conditions for peace negotiations with the powers mediating: 1) the preservation and guarantee of Turkish territorial integrity; 2) Russian evacuation of the Danubian Principalities; 3) renewal and observance of the London Convention of 1841 (see Note 458); 4) respect of the Sultan's sovereignty. These conditions were approved by a new Vienna conference of the ambassadors on 13 January 1854 and forwarded to the Russian Government. However, Russia refused to accept the mediation of the powers and agreed to direct negotiations with Turkey. The participants in the Vienna conference rejected Russia's proposals
  5. ↑ Palmerston's short resignation of his post as Home Secretary (16-24 December 1853). His resignation was not accepted, however (on this see Marx's article 'Palmerston's Resignation', present edition, Vol. 12)
  6. ↑ Note signed by the British, French and Prussian Ambassadors in Constantinople on 12 December 1853 and handed to Turkey on 15 December 1853 (see Note 467)
  7. ↑ Ferdinand von Westphalen
  8. ↑ Caroline von Westphalen
  9. ↑ Engels' letter to Steffen has not been found
  10. ↑ Engels was in London (see Note 461) he presumably discussed with Marx his plan to write such a work for the English Press. This plan did not materialise
  11. ↑ embarrassment
  12. ↑ K. Marx, 'The Knight of the Noble Consciousness'.